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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION,
FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAWMAKING SYSTEM
Michael B. Rappaport*
As a fusionist, 1 or moderate libertarian with conservative
influences, I was alarmed by the election of Barack Obama and a
largely Democratic Congress. Based on Obama's campaigning
and his voting record, I believed that he was likely to strongly
favor a variety of programs that would significantly increase the
size of government. Combined with a Congress that had large
Democratic majorities in both houses. the stage seemed set for a
large expansion of government.
Increasing the risk of government growth was the financial
crisis that preceded the election. The financial sector's significant
problems led many people to anticipate a severe economic
downturn, perhaps one approaching that of the Great
Depression. With an emergency of that kind. people often look
to the government to do something to address the problem.
Thus, President Obama and the Congressional Democrats
seemed to have both the power and opportunity to significantly
grow the government. Moreover, the Administration appeared
to recognize this too. as suggested by Chief of Staff Rahm
Emmanuel's infamous statement that "[y]ou never want a
serious crisis to go to waste."'
The possibility of another New Deal is a scary thought to
someone with small government views. Yet, this was certainly
not the only possible result. The last time there was a
* Class of 1975 Professor of Law. University of San Diego. I would like to thank
John McGinnis for comments on an earlier draft of this essav.
I. My fusionism derives primarily from Friedrich Hayek's works. See. e.g..
FRIEDRICH HAYEK. THE Co~snn_;no~ OF LIBERTY ( 1%0). Another form of fusionism
is associated with the works of Frank Mever. See FRA"K MEYER. IN DEFE~SE OF
FREEDOM: A CONSERVATIVE CREDO ( 1962)·.
2. See Gerald F. Seib. In Crisis, Opporrunitr for Ohama. WALL ST. J .. Nov. 21.
2001( at A2.

215

216

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:215

Democratic President, with large Democratic congressional
majorities, who sought to restructure health care, the result was
not larger, but smaller government. The two years when
President Clinton and the Congressional Democrats governed
led to a rejection of health care restructuring and a Republican
takeover of Congress. Thus, one possibility is that the Obama
presidency might lead the country to reject big government ideas
and to replace them with the smaller government notions. I have
called this "the Carter/Clinton scenario'' -a reference to the last
two times that Democrats controlled all three lawmaking
branches, which led to the smaller government victories of
Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich.'
Reflections on these different possible results-of a Second
New Deal, of the Carter/Clinton scenario, and of something in
between-naturally leads one to ponder the forces in the
political system that determine whether one party rule leads to
fundamental institutional change, like the New Deal, or to a
rejection by the voters. It also leads one to ponder the normative
question of whether, and how much, a constitutional system
should place limits on a majority's ability to enact fundamental
change.
In this short essay, I explore fundamental institutional
change and argue that a desirable constitution should constrain
such change. I argue that many of the reasons that justify strict
limitations on the passage of constitutional amendments also
justify constraints on fundamental institutional change. I then
show that the modern American constitutional system does
place significant limits on basic institutional change. Far from
allowing a single election in which a short term majority can
secure power to enact enormous change, it employs several
limitations on radical change, including the American tricameral lawmaking system and the institution of midterm
elections. I then examine three historical periods, that of the
New Deal, the Great Society, and the early Clinton
Administration, to support my analysis. I conclude by applying
the analysis to the Obama Administration and suggesting that if
it does enact fundamental institutional change, it will do so only
by surmounting the not insubstantial checks that the American
constitutional system places on such change. Finally, I should
3. While the Republican Party generally embraces smaller government than the
Democrats, it certainly has its big government wing of which George W. Bush and John
McCain were recent leaders. If the Carter/Clinton scenario places Republicans in control
of the lawmaking branches. it would likely be the Republicans' smaller government wing.
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note that this essay was completed, except for minor style edits,
at the end of October, 2009, when it was not clear whether, and
if so, in what form, the Democrat's health care restructuring
would pass. I have not changed the essay to reflect subsequent
developments.
I.

THE TWO SENSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In examining the ability of a majority to effect fundamental
change, it is useful to distinguish two different senses of the
constitution of a country and two corresponding senses of
constitutional change. The first meaning of a constitution is a
document that contains the fundamental law of the nation.
Under this meaning, constitutional change occurs when the
document's provisions are altered. The most obvious way to
alter them is through constitutional amendments, but sometimes
the courts can as a functional matter. if not a formal one, effect
constitutional change by reinterpreting the constitution's
meaning.
The second meaning of a constitution is an older one. One
can understand the constitution of a nation as "the basic
principles and laws of a nation ... that determine the powers and
duties of the government and guarantee certain rights to the
people in it.''~ There is nothing in this definition about a written
document.' Instead, it refers to the basic principles and laws of a
nation. Under this definition. the most important legal and
political institutions would count as the constitution of the
nation, even though they were not described in a single
document. Constitutional change would then occur when those
fundamental principles and laws were altered. To distinguish this
type of constitutional change from the previous one, I shall call
this type ''fundamental institutional change."
The New Deal involved both types of constitutional change.
First, during the New Deal, the Supreme Court altered its
interpretation of the Constitution to vastly expand federal power
and to relax other constitutional limitations, such as the
separation of powers and the protection of economic liberties.

4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIO'OARY 248 (10th ed. 1997).
5. In fact. the dictionary goes on to state as a distinct definition. "a written
instrument embodying the rules of a political or social organization... MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 248 (lOth ed. 1997). F~r a recent discussion of
one version of this understanding of a constitution. see Ernest A. Young. The
Constirution Outside the Constitution. 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
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While the document was not formally amended. the functional
meaning of the Constitution was dramatically changed.
Second. the New Deal changed the nation's fundamental
institutions. moving us from a country of limited government
and federalism to one with a larger government, at both the state
and federal level, that regulated the economy and provided an
economic safety net. It is true that an interpretive change of the
document's meaning was necessary to effect these changes in
fundamental institutions. Without those interpretive changes.
most of the institutional changes might have been deemed
unconstitutionaL as the National Industrial Recovery Act was."
But even if no interpretive changes had been necessary, the large
number of significant institutions that the New Deal enacted.
including the Social Security Retirement Program. unemployment
insurance, federal deposit insurance, the Tennessee Valley
Authority. the Works Progress Administration, the securities acts.
and the National Labor Relations Act. transformed the nature of
7
American government and society.
Of these two types of constitutional change. it is the second
type that is raised by the election of Barack Obama. It is true
that President Obama could have significant effects on the
Supreme Court, since the Court is now often split 5-4, with
Justice Kennedy as a swing vote. If Justice Kennedy or one of
the four more conservative justices were to step down, then the
replacement that Obama appoints could be quite important,
shifting the Court's balance of power. But as significant as this
might seem, it is not what now appears most consequential for
the nation. The Court has been closely divided for a long time.
Moreover. it seems unlikely that Justice Kennedy or the four
more conservative justices would voluntarily step down to allow
Obama an appointment. Thus, a vacancy of this kind, although
not impossible. seems unlikely, at least during Obama 's first
term.
Rather, it is the possibility of the second type of
constitutional change that is the prime concern. There is a range
of legislation that the Obama Administration seems to support
that would effect dramatic change. To mention just the most
important examples, the Obama Administration, first, favors a
substantial restructuring of health care. with a significant public
6. See ALA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935):
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
7. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
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option that is often discussed by both left and ri&ht as a means of
moving towards a governmental system. Second, the
Administration also favors a substantial cap and trade law that
would significantly restrict greenhouse gases by allocating
allowances to businesses. 9 Third, the Administration has
proposed large changes to the financial regulatory system, with
10
new agencies and additional regulatory powers. Fourth, the
Administration seems likely to support the Employee Free
Choice Act. 11 Under this legislation, which Obama co-sponsored
as a Senator. 12 unions could be formed by a majority of workers
signing a card, rather than through a secret ballot, and
mandatory arbitration could be used to resolve the first union
contract. Finally, the Administration supports a large number of
programs that increase government involvement in education at
levels ranging from preschool to higher education. 13
If all of these programs were enacted, they would establish
quite dramatic, perhaps radical, change in government
institutions. The basic laws, institutions, and principles of the
American system of government- its constitution- would have
been altered.
II. HOW SHOULD A CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
GOVERN FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE?
The possibility of such dramatic change raises the question
of what limitations a constitutional system should place on such
fundamental institutional change. In this section, I argue that
fundamental institutional changes, like changes of the
8. Robert Pear. Doctors' Group Opposes Public Insurance Plan. N.Y. TiMES. June
11.2009. at A19.
9. Helene Cooper & John M. Broder. At M.l. T., Obama Presses Case for Focus on
Using Renewable Energy. N.Y. TiMES. Oct. 24. 2009. at A13.
10. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOL'NDATION 10-18 (2009). available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
Final Report_web.pdf.
11. H.R. 1409. 111 th Con g. (2009): S. 560. lllth Cong. (2009).
12. See GovTrack: Senate Vote on Cloture to Motion to Proceed: H.R. 800 (llOth]:
Employee Free Choice Act of 2007. available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
vote.xpd?vote=s2007 -227.
13. See generally Transcript of The President's Remarks to the Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce (Mar. 10. 2009). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-thePresident-to-the-United-States-Hispanic-Chamber-of-Commerce/ (discussing support for
numerous government programs including Early Head Start. Head Start. the Earlv
Learning College Grant. the Teacher's Advancement Program. and increased Peil
Grants): see also Libby Quaid. Obama Backs Teacher Merit Pav. Charter Schools.
ASSOCIATED PRESS. Mar. 10. 2009. available at http://abcn~ws.go.com/Politics/
wireStory?id= 7044733.
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constitutional document. should be significantly constrained to
further important goals, such as consensus, nonpartisanship, and
more accurate decision making. Such fundamental institutional
change should only occur if it can surmount significant
procedural hurdles.
To analyze limitations on institutional change, we can
imagine a system in which no significant limits on such change
exist. Assume. then, a stylized version of the political system of
Great Britain. Under this system, laws are enacted by a single
legislative house that operates under parliamentary principles
with the same party controlling both the legislature and
executive. Because there are no additional constitutional
constraints. a majority of the legislature could theoretically pass
any law (except perhaps a law that changes this arrangement).
Moreover. a majority. absent losing a vote of no confidence,
could govern for five years without holding an election. Clearly.
such a system would allow enormous institutional change- the
second type of constitutional change- to be passed with a simple
majority.
In the United States. it is generally thought undesirable to
allow constitutional change of the first type- of the
constitutional document- to be made by legislative majorities.
To pass a constitutional amendment at the federal level. one
needs to surmount a double supermajority rule of two thirds to
1
propose and then three quarters to ratify. • In my view. these
supermajority
rules
generate
desirable
constitutional
amendments. because they promote several important features
of a . good. constit~tion, such as consensus ~UP~,ort,
nonpartlsanship, and bemg based on accurate factual beliefs. ·
But these rules do not apply to the second type of
constitutional change- fundamental institutional change. Yet,
many of the same reasons for restricting changes in the
constitutional document also suggest restricting changes in
fundamental institutions. Provisions in the constitutional
document are generally entrenched against repeal through the
ordinary legislative process and therefore they last for long
periods. It is this characteristic of constitutional provisions that
generally justifies employing supermajority rules. While basic

14. See L'.S. Co:-;sT. art. V. While manv commentators believe these supermajority
rules are too strict. thev often favor some supermajority rule. just a more lenient one.
15. See John 0. ·McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport. Majority and Supermajority
Ruin: Three Vinn of the Capitol. R5 TEX. L. RE\. 1115. 1170-R2 (2007).
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institutional changes are not formally entrenched, they
nonetheless are difficult to repeal and therefore share some of
the functional characteristics of entrenchments. First many of
the fundamental institutions enacted during the New Deal as
well as those proposed by the Obama Administration operate as
entitlement legislation. 16 They grant people a right to certain
benefits, usually at a cost significantly below what they would
otherwise have to pay. Once these entitlements are enacted, the
beneficiaries typically fight hard to protect their "rights'' from
being repealed or reduced.
The functional characteristics of entrenchments are also
shared by other types of legislation, such as regulatory laws.
Such regulatory laws can also benefit significant interest groups,
such as organized business or labor interests. Moreover, the
regulatory agency that administers the law is an important
beneficiary, with significant knowledge and access to the
lawmakers to lobby against its repeal. It is striking that so few
administrative agencies have been eliminated over the years.
Given the difficulties of reversing fundamental institutional
change, strong arguments exist for placing checks on a simple
majority's ability to enact it. The arguments for these checks are
similar to but distinct from those for constitutional amendments.
Thus, there are strong benefits from employing supermajority
rules and from using other mechanisms that limit short term
majorities from enacting fundamental institutional change.
First, one reason to check fundamental institutional change
is to increase the chances that it is supported by a consensus of
the country. Enacting fundamental institutional change under
simple majority rule would be problematic because it allows a
mere majority to enact basic changes that might be strongly
opposed by a large minority. Requiring a supermajority rule
here would necessitate more of a consensus to enact such basic
changes.
Second, another reason to check fundamental institutional
change is to promote its enactment based on the public interest
rather than on partisan considerations such as what will help the
majority's political party. Unfortunately, legislators often
support programs that would promote key constituents of their
party, such as labor unions or corporations, even if that would
not be good policy. Requiring a supermajority to enact basic
16. The paradigmatic New Deal example is Social Securitv. Presumablv. both
health care and cap and trade would function much like entitlement~.
·
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provisions, however, will often require one party to secure
support from the other party to pass legislation, thereby
reducing the partisanship involved.
A third reason to place limits on fundamental institutional
change is to promote enactment through procedures that make it
likely to lead to good results. One problem with fundamental
institutional change that cannot easily be repealed is that it lasts
for a long period. Enacting desirable long term provisions is
difficult because it requires hard-to-acquire knowledge of how
these institutions will operate over time. Moreover, people have
a tendency to assume that existing circumstances that might
support these programs will continue in the future. 1' People also
tend to be too prone to believe that programs designed to
achieve certain results will actually do so. If people, then, are too
quick to enact such provisions, then one might want to require
additional support for such programs to increase the likelihood
that the programs that are enacted actually have the effects they
are intended to have.
A final reason to limit fundamental changes it that it
prevents a short term majority from making relatively
permanent changes. Sometimes a party can gain a large majority
because of a scandal (such as Watergate) or an aberrational
issue, but not have the nation's support on other issues. In this
situation, it is useful to have mechanisms. other than
supermajority rules, that limit that majority from passing laws
the public does not support. One such mechanism that I discuss
here is to require the majority to secure support again in an
upcoming election.
III. RESTRICTING FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: THE SIMPLE MODEL
How. then, does the American constitutional system
restrain basic institutional change? One central feature of that
system, which differs from our stylized British system, is that the
American system employs three separate lawmaking entities: the
House, the Senate, and the President. Each of these entities is
elected in a different way. As Buchanan and Tullock pointed out
nearly a half century ago, this system operates as a kind of
supermajority rule. 1R It requires more support from the populace
17.

McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 15. at 1173.

18. JAMES M. BuCHANA~ & GORDON TULLOCK. THE CALCL'LCS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOLJNDA TIONS OF CONSTITCTIONAL DEMOCRACY 23~8 ( 1962).
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to secure a majority in each of these lawmaking institutions than
to do so in a single legislative house.
This check requires that the lawmaking institutions differ
from one another, which they do in a variety of ways. First, they
are selected by different electorates, with House members
elected by districts, but Senators and the President elected by
the entire state. Second. they are elected at different times for
different periods, with all House members standing for election
every two years, the President every four years, and Senators
every six years, with one third of the Senate standing every two
years. Thus, the lawmakers will reflect the views of electors from
different periods and will have different degrees of insulation
from the electorate. Finally, the lawmakers will often be elected
based on distinct considerations, with the President often being
selected for his foreign policy expertise and House members for
more domestic considerations. Overall, then, the differences in
the lawmaking branches operate to establish a relatively weak
supermajority rule.
In addition to this implicit supermajority rule, there is also
the express supermajority requirement of overcoming the Senate
filibuster. Ending a filibuster has required three-fifths of the
Senate since 1975, but generally required two thirds of the
Senate for much of the twentieth century. It is true that the
filibuster is not a constitutional requirement, but Senators have
strong incentives to keep the filibuster, since it enhances their
individual power.
As a result of the filibuster, the majority party needs not
only the presidency and a House majority, but at least 60
Senators to enact its agenda. This requirement makes it even less
likely that a party will be able to secure the requisite support. It
is not so easy to secure 60 percent of the Senate along with
control of the presidency and the House of Representatives.
Of course, even if a single party does secure a dominant
majority, that would not necessarily result in fundamental
institutional change. It would also be necessary for the key
players in that party-the President and a majority of the party's
caucus in each house-to be in favor of such change. But that
will not always be the case. For example, President Carter had a
dominant majority in 1976, but did not seem to pursue basic
institutional change. 19
19. While the Democrats have had dominant majorities at various times since the
New Deal. these numbers often overstate the party's power because on issues. such as

224

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:215

If one party does secure the requisite majorities, it then has
two years to enact its agenda before having to face the voters
again. But after two years, the entire House of Representatives
and one third of the Senate would stand for reelection. Thus, if
the fundamental institutional change sought by the majority
party was popular, the majority party would retain its power and
could continue with its agenda. But if the voters disapproved of
the radical agenda, they could put an end to it. They could do
this by providing control of the House to the other party or
reducing the majority control of the Senate below the level
necessary to end a filibuster. Thus, the constitutional system
places a two year limit on a temporary majority's ability to enact
fundamental institutional change without facing the voters.

IV. RESTRICTING FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: THE MORE COMPLEX MODEL
While the simple model presented in the previous section
suggests that there is a check on fundamental institutional
change, this model actually understates the check. A more
complex model suggests that the American constitutional system
imposes a greater check that derives from two additional
sources: from a more realistic analysis of the actual power of
legislative majorities and from the shadow of the midterm
elections.
While the simple model assumes that a majority of sixty
percent in the Senate and fifty one percent in the House is
necessary to pass large institutional change, this prediction may
understate the requisite degree of support. Suppose that the
Democrats hold 60 Senate seats and therefore require every
Democratic Senator's vote to end a filibuster. To pass sweeping
legislation, the Democrats will certainly need the support of a
majority of their party. But having the support of the majority
does not mean that they will also have the support of the most
moderate members of their party. The most conservative
Democratic Senators are likely to have different political
preferences and may not, despite the forces of party loyalty, go
along with the bulk of their party's agenda. In this situation, the
dominant party may not be able to enact the sweeping
legislation.
civil rights. the party was split. with Southern Democrats being strongly opposed.
Democratic opponents of expansion of the New Deal also appeared to have placed a
break on fundamental change during Roosevelt's second term.
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To pass this sweeping legislation, the dominant party may
need a comfortable margin over the minimum necessary to pass
a law. If the Democrats in the above example had 68 Senators,
then they could lose 8 Senators and still pass the legislation. In
this situation, none of the Senators would enjoy the monopoly
power to hold out his support in return for undue benefits.
Moreover, with 68 Senators, the Democrats would be more
likely to find 60 Senators who ideologically favor the legislation.
Thus, enacting fundamental institutional change would be much
easier with majorities larger than the minimum necessary to pass
a law.
The second feature of the more complex model involves the
20
time during which the dominant majority can enact its agenda.
While the simple model implies that the majority party has two
years to enact its agenda before the midterm election, a more
subtle analysis suggests that there is less time before the voters
may make their opinions known. As the majority party proceeds
to enact its agenda, the voters can express their views through
public opinion polls. If the country dislikes the measures that the
majority party is enacting, the popularity of the President and
the congressional majority will decline. The members of this
party who are up for reelection and are most vulnerable to losing
their seats may then refuse to go along with these unpopular
measures.
In this way, the shadow of the midterm elections operates to
constrain the dominant majority. Thus, there is not even a two
year period before the majority must face the voters. Instead, it
might be as short as six months or a year before the public can
make their feelings known and begin to cut back on a radical
agenda.c 1
20. A temporal dimension enters into the analysis in another way. To secure the
large supermajorities necessary to pass enormous institutional change would ordinarily
require more than a single congressional election. By largely requiring a party to obtain
the support of the voters at more than one election. the political system makes it more
difficult for a temporary majority to enact radical change.
21. These models assume that only a single party enacts radical change, but this is
an oversimplification. Sometimes members of the two parties may be split on issues and
controversial legislation can be enacted through a coalition. as occurred with enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The
Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and Its Interpretation. 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003). At other times, a majority
party may have significant. but not dominant control of the lawmaking branches, and
may secure additional support for popular legislation from members of the other party.
An example of this situation is the Reagan Administration's enactment in 1981 of
substantial tax cuts with the support of a significant number of Democrats. See STEVEN
F. HAYWARD. THE AGE OF REAGAN: THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION
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The various mechanisms highlighted in these two models
operate to place limits on fundamental institutional change at
the federal level. While these mechanisms are certainly desirable
for the reasons discussed above, I do not argue that they are
ideal, because other considerations might favor different
22
mechanisms. One additional complication concerning these
mechanisms is that they apply to both ordinary legislation and
legislation that effects fundamental change. As a result, they are
23
not ideal for either type of legislation. If one makes the
mechanisms ideal for fundamental institutional change, then
they will block too much ordinary legislation. If one makes them
ideal for ordinary legislation, they will permit too much
fundamental institutional change. Thus, the mechanisms need to
be a compromise between the ideals for basic institutional
change and for ordinary legislation. ~
2

V. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES SUPPORTING THE
ANALYSIS
We can illustrate and support this analysis by examining
three diverse historical examples. These examples involve one
dominant majority that passed enormous institutional change for
two years and then secured the approval of the voters for more
substantial change; another dominant majority that passed
enormous institutional change during its initial years and then
was stopped by the midterm elections; and a third, smaller
dominant majority that was not even able to enact substantial
change during its initial two years.

1980-1989. at 144--66 (2009). Ultimately. the mechanisms that limit fundamental change
also work when that change is effected through a bipartisan coalition.
22. Unfortunately. I do not have space to address these other considerations. To
mention just one example, if one favors small government. then one might advocate strict
limits on federal power. as existed under the original Constitution. so that most
fundamental change has to occur at the state level under a system of state competition.
See also McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 15. at 1126-40 (discussing use of more
focused supermajority rules to protect against biases in favor of certain types of
legislation).
.
.
.
23. It may be necessary that the mechanisms apply to both ordmary leg1slatwn and
legislation that effects fundamental change. because it is difficult to draw a clear
distinction between these two types of legislation.
24. For a discussion of the proper mechanisms for enacting ordinary legislation. see
McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 15. at 1126-40.
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THE NEW DEAL
The paradigmatic example of fundamental institutional
change is the New Deal. While the New Deal transformed the
nation's institutions, it did so because of its electoral triumphs.
In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt won a landslide election
following Herbert Hoover's unpopular response to the Great
Depression. The 1932 election also produced enormous gains for
the Democrats in Congress with the Democrats picking up 97
25
seats in the House and 12 in the Senate. See Figure 1. This
translated into 73 percent of the House and 62 percent of the
Senate. Significantly, in the 1934 midterm elections, the
Democrats did not lose seats, but gained 9 additional
Representatives and 8 more Senators. Democratic gains
continued in the 1936 elections, with the party finally suffering
losses only in the 1938 midterm elections.
A.

%Dem
Senate
%Dem
49
51
47D 48R
73
59D 36R
62
76
69D 25R
73
Figure 1
These dramatic and consistent electoral victories translated
into enormous institutional change. The initial victories allowed
Congress in 1933 to enact Federal Deposit Insurance, 26 the
Glass-Steagall Act, 2- the Civilian Conservation Corps., 28 the
Public Works Administration, 2" and the Tennessee Valley
Authority.'() Congress also passed securities laws in 193331 and
32
1934. In addition, the 1933 Congress also passed the National
Industrial Recovery Ad3 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 34
which allowed the federal government tremendous power over
industrial and agricultural production. Both of these statutes,
Year
1930
1932
1934

House
220D 214R
313D 117R
322D 103R

25.

These totals and those in the other figures in this essay are derived from 2
1307--{)8 (6th ed. 2008).
26. Emergency Banking Act. Pub. L. No. 73-1.48 Stat. 1 (1933).
27. Banking Act of 1933. ch. 89.48 Stat. 162 (1933).
28. Pub. L. No. 73-15.48 Stat. 22 (1933).
29. The Public Works Administration was created by The National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933. ch. 90. 48 Stat. 195 (1933 ).
30. Tennessee Valley Authority Act. ch. 32.48 Stat. 58 (1933).
31. Securities Act of 1933. ch. 38.48 Stat. 74 (1933).
32. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. ch. 404. 48 Stat. 881 (1934 ).
33. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. ch. 90.48 Stat. 195 (1933).
34. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Pub. L. No. 73-10.48 Stat. 31 (1933).

Gl'IDE TO CO:--iGRESS
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however, were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.''
Had the Democrats lost a substantial number of seats in the
1934 midterm elections, the New Deal might have ended. But
instead, they gained seats. allowing for the Second New Deal. In
1935. Congress was able to enact further fundamental change,
including the Social Security Retirement Program, 36
Un.emplo~ment Insuranc~,' Aid to Familie~ with D~pendent
Children, and the NatiOnal Labor Relations Act. These
extremely important programs became largely permanent
changes to the American political landscape.
The New Deal experience thus supports my analysis. First,
the New Deal was able to enact radical institutional change by
securing very large majorities. These majorities were huge in
1932 and grew over time, with the Democrats enjoying
approximately 75 percent of Congress in 1934. Second, the New
Deal kept the confidence of the people. While the voters could
have placed a brake on the Democrats in 1934 (or 1936), they
endorsed the New Deal with Democratic electoral victories. The
New Deal was not the result of a short term majority, but of a
significant change in the beliefs of the American people.
7

B.

THE GREAT SOCIETY

The second example of fundamental institutional change is
the Great Society (including the Civil Rights Laws) passed
during the Johnson Administration. With the assassination of
President Kennedy in 1963, Lyndon Johnson became President,
inheriting a significant Democratic House and Senate. See
Figure 2..w But in the 1964 election, Johnson and the
congressional Democrats demolished Barry Goldwater and the
Republicans, gaining 37 seats in the House and 1 in the Senate.
The election left the Democrats with over two thirds of both the
House and Senate. In the 1966 midterm elections, however, the
Democrats suffered significant defeats, losing 47 seats in the
House and 4 in the Senate.
35. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
the National Industrial Recoverv Act unconstitutional): United States v. Butler. 297 U.S.
1 (1936) (holding the Agricultur~l Adjustment Act to be unconstitutional).
36. Social Securitv Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 201-210.49 Stat. at 622-25.
37. Social Securitv Act. Pub. L. No. 74-271. §§ 301-303,49 Stat. at 625-26.
38. Social Security Act. Pub. L. No. 74-271. §§ 401-406. 49 Stat. at 626-28.
39. Pub. L. No. 74-198.49 Stat. 449 (1935).
40. 2 GL'IDE TO CONGRESS. supra note 25. at 1308.
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%Dem
Senate
%Dem
67
59
67D 33R
68
68D 32R
68
64
57
64D 36R
Figure 2
The Great Society began in 1964 after the change from a
more moderate President Kennedy to a more aggressive
President Johnson. Johnson pushed throu_Bh the Civil Rights A~t
of 1964,41 the Food Stamps program,- and the Economic
43
Opportunity Act of 1964. This last law established the office of
Economic Opportunity to administer a variety of programs
dubbed the War on Poverty, including VISTA. the Model Cities
Program, Upward Bound, and Head Start. 44
While these programs were significant, it was the next
Congress- with its enormous majorities- that passed the most
extensive and controversial changes. In 1965, Congress enacted
46
4
7
both Medicare ' and Medicaid, the Votinft Rights Act: the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 4 which for the first
time provided significant federal aid to public education, the
Immigration and Nationality Services Act, which abolished
4
national origin quotas, " and legislation creating the National
Endowments for the Arts and Humanities.'"
This fundamental institutional change again supports my
analysis. First, the Democrats needed substantial majorities to
Year
1962
1964
1966

House
258D 176R
295D 140R
248D 187R

41. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L No. 88-352. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
42. Food Stamp Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-525. 78 Stat. 703 (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011 2036 (2000)).
43. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-452. 78 Stat. 508 (1964 ).
repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35. § 683(a). 95 Stat. 519 (1981).
44. See Deborah J. Cantrell. Common Ground: The Case for Col/aboratimz Between
Anti-Poverty Advocates and Public Interest Intellectual Prop~m· Ad~·ocates. 15 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 415.420 n.l9 (2008) (discussing the funding of VISTA as part of the
War on Poverty): Jeffrey S. Lehman. To Conceptualize, to Criticize, to Defend. to
Improve: Understanding America's Welfare State. 101 YALE L.J. 685. 695 (1991) (briefly
discussing the Model Cities program. Upward Bound. and Head Start).
45. Social Security Act of !965 Title XVIII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (2000).
46. Social Security Act of 1'165 Title XIX. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13'16-1396v (2000).
47. Voting Rights Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 8'1-110. 79 Stat. 437.
48. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-10. 7'1 Stat.
27.

49.

Immigration and Nationality Services Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-236. 7'1 Stat.

911.
50. National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities Act of I '165. Pub. L. No. 89209.79 Stat. 845 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-68 (1988 & Supp. 111'190)).
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pass this legislation, with the huge majorities in 1964 allowing
Congress to pass the most controversial and radical changes.
Second, the Great Society largely stopped after the 1966
midterm elections, when the nation appeared to record its
disapproval of the extent and pace of Democratic governance
through large Republican gains. Thus. unlike the New Deal,
which gained seats after the midterm elections, the Great Society
lost support and was essentially terminated.
C.

THE EARLY CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND
HEALTH CARE RESTRUCTURING

The last historical example involves the 1992 election of Bill
Clinton. Prior to this election, the Democrats had enjoyed
significant control of the Congress. while the Republicans had
held the White House. Thus, the election of a Democratic
President seemed like it might lead to significant change. The
Democrats now had control over all three lawmaking branches.
with healthy majorities in the House (59 percent) and Senate (57
51
percent). See Figure 3. The only real limitation was that
Democrats did not enjoy a filibuster proof Senate majority. Two
years later in the midterm elections. however. the Democrats
lost both the House and the Senate.

Year
1992
1994

House
258D 176R
204D 230R

%Dem
Senate
%Dem
59
57D 43R
57
47
47D 53R
47
Figure 3
During its first two years, the Clinton Administration
pursued a variety of legislative proposals, but overall they did
not constitute dramatic change.'" The one potential example of
dramatic change involved the Administration's attempt to pass a
51. 2 GUIDE TO CONGRESS. supra note 25. at 1308.
52. The Clinton Administration enacted NAFT A. but did so with the assistance of
more Republicans than Democrats. See Ranko Shiraki Oliver. In the Twelve Years of
NAFTA, the Treaty Gave Me ... What, Exactly 7 : An Assessment of Economic, Social, and
Political Developments in Mexico Since 1994 and Their Impact on Mexican Immigration
into the United States. 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 53. 65 n.58 (2007). The Administration
also was able to have Congress enact a tax increase on higher income individuals and
corporations. while expanding the earned income tax credit. but this hardly seems
enormous. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-66. 107 Stat.
312. The Administration also attempted to allow gays to serve in the military. with the
result that the Don't Ask. Don't Tell policy was enacted by Congress. Pub. L. No. 103160 (codified at 10 U.S. C.§ 654).
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comprehensive health care plan that would have radically
changed the health care system.'' After much debate, the plan
was resisted in both the House and Senate, and ultimately
defeated.
One way to understand the health care defeat is to see it as
the result of overreaching by the Clinton Administration. While
the Democrats certainly had a substantial majority, that majority
was not of the overwhelming size that the Democrats enjoyed
during the New Deal or Great Society. The Clinton
Administration may also have overestimated its power due to
confusion about the meaning of its election. President Clinton
had campaigned as a New Democrat, which led people to
believe he would not pursue dramatic leftward change.
Moreover, Clinton may have been elected only because there
was a three-way race, with Ross Perot taking many votes from
George Bush. Thus, the country might have elected President
Clinton, even though it did not favor dramatic change toward
government health care.
Once again, the failure of the Clinton Administration to
enact substantial institutional change supports my analysis. The
Democrats, especially the liberal wing of the party, did not have
sufficient majorities to secure passage of the Administration's
health care plan. Moreover, the midterm elections allowed the
voters to express their disapproval of the Democratic Congress's
behavior. Thus, what appeared to be a short term majority was
eliminated.
VI. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
This brings us to the 2008 election, which placed Barack
Obama in the White House and significantly strengthened the
Democrats' congressional majorities. Initially, one suspects that
both the Obama Administration and many of its critics believed
that the Administration would be able to enact a large portion of
its agenda and thereby effect fundamental institutional change.
4
But at presene it is not clear how much of that agenda, besides
the Stimulus Law, will be enacted.
53. Whether the Clinton Administration's health care plan. by itself. constituted
fundamental change might be disputed. Certainly. the Clinton agenda was much less
ambitious than the Obama agenda is. But it is unnecessary to answer this question here.
because the country rejected the Clinton health care plan. whatever kind of change it
represented.
54. The "present" here refers to the end of October. 2009. the point at which the
essay was substantially completed.
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Clearly, the Democrats have a significant majority. They
have 58 Senators plus 2 Independents who caucus with them,
making for the 60 Senators necessary to end a filibuster. They
also have a 258-177 advantage in the House. While substantial,
these majorities fall far short of the Democrats majorities during
the New Deal and the Great Society. They are much closer to
those enjoyed by the Clinton Administration, with the important
exception that the current Democrats are better able to
overcome the filibuster.
Another similarity with the Clinton Administration is that it
is by no means clear that Obama was elected to pursue a left
wing agenda. While Obama famously campaigned on "change"
and certainly talked about health care reform, he also appeared
to run as a non-partisan candidate who would work with the
Republicans-not something that a dramatic move to the left
would allow. Moreover, Obama, who also ran as something of a
post-racial candidate, seemed to benefit from many people's
desire to elect the first African-American President.'"
Obama also benefited politically from the severe economic
downturn that preceded the election. This downtown occurred
on George Bush's watch and it was natural for the public to
blame the Republicans for the crisis. Voters who supported
Obama because of the recession would naturally expect his
primary concern to be restoring the economy rather than
pursuing other goals.
These factors suggest that there might be strong resistance
to Obama's agenda for substantial change. Two of the principal
items on the agenda-health care restructuring and cap and
trade-are not really attempts to address the downturn. In fact,
these proposals may exacerbate the crisis, because they are likely
to involve increases in taxes, debt, or costs of production. If
these legislative proposals were responding to the downturn, the
Obama Administration would probably find it easier to enact
them, since it would be addressing a problem widely held to
require efforts to solve it.
The Stimulus Law does appear to be directed at the
recession,"" but even this law has been a source of great
controversy. Many critics view the law as another example of the
55. Although some people. no doubt. opposed Obama because of his race. it is my
judgment that the political benefits far outweighed the costs for him.
56. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-5. 123 Stat.
115.
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Obama Administration pursuing a big government agenda
rather than addressing the recession. They believe that the law is
too costly and focuses on expenditures rather than tax cuts.'"
Moreover, they argue that the bulk of the expenditures, which
are directed towards government rather than the private sector,
do not occur immediately, but only years in the future.'" In
addition, the Obama Administration now seeks to make one
third of the Stimulus expenditures permanent.'" In addition to
suggesting that the Stimulus Law was part of a big government
approach. the critics also claim that the lack of Republican
support for the Stimulus. with no House Republicans and only
three Senate Republicans supporting it. indicates that Obama 's
promises of non-partisanship were hollow.
These concerns about President Obama pursuing an
ideological agenda in a partisan manner, combined with a
continuing decline in the economy,w have had their effect on his
popularity. According to the Gallup PolL Obama's job approval
rating was in the low 60s in his first two quarters, but fell 9 points
1
to 53 in the third quarter." This historically large decline"' left
Obama with a relatively low approval rating for this time in his
57. See generally H.R. REP. No. 111-16. at 413-71\1 (2009): see also National
Association of Realtors. American Recm-err and Reim'fSiment Acr of 2009.
http://www.realtor.org/government_affairs/gapubiiciamerican_recovery_reinvestment_
act_home (noting that roughly 35% of the stimulus package was devoted to tax cuts. with
the rest devoted to spending).
5K See Edward P. Lazear. Op-Ed. Do We Need a Second Srimulus". WALL ST. J ..
July 9. 2009. at Al5. available ar http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI24709595712615003.
html (noting that according to the Congressional Budget Office. the largest amount of
the stimulus spending occurs in 2010. and the amount spent in 2011 is nearly as much as
spent in 2009).
59. Alex Brill & Amy Roden. A Sickening De(icir. FORBES.C0\1. Oct. IR. 2009.
http://www .forbes.com/2009/ I 0/ I R/heal th-care-stimul us-deficit -opinions-contributorsalex-brill-amy-roden.html ( .. All told. the Obama administration's budget seeks to make
at least 37% of ARRA ·s spending and tax cuts permanent on an annual basis ... ).
60. Between January and September of 2009. the unemployment rose more than 2
points from 7.6 to 9.8 percent. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey. http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/
SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_n umbers&series_id=LNS 14000000 (last visited
Oct. 25. 2009). At the end of October. however. the Department of Commerce
announced that the economy had grown 3.5 percent in the third quarter of 2009. which
growth. if sustained. might signal the official end of the recession. See Catherine
Rampell. U.S. Economv Began ro Gnm· Again in 3rd Quarrer. N.Y. TI~1ES. October 30.
2009. at AI. available ar http://www.nvtimes.com/2009/10/30/business/economv/
30econ. h tml ?ref= business.
·
·
61. See
Gallup
Poll.
http:/;www.gallup.comlpoll; 123806;0bama-Quarterlv·
Approval-A verage-Siips- Nine- Po in ts.aspx.
62. According to Gallup ... the 9-point drop in the most recent quarter is the largest
Gallup has ever measured for an elected president between the second and third quarters
of his term. dating back to 1953 ... Gallup Poll. supra note 61.
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presidency, and within 5 points of Bill Clinton's low 48 percent
at the comparable time in his presidency. 63 Significantly.
Obama's approval rating is even lower among independents.~>-~
These declines in Obama's popularity reduce his ability to enact
his agenda. The less popular he and his proposals are, the less
likely that marginal legislators will support them.
While these weaknesses raise the possibility that Obama
will not enact all or most of his agenda, this is merely a
possibility, not a certainty. Obama has many resources, including
large congressional majorities and a majority of his party who
appear to strongly favor these measures. Moreover. his
popularity could improve significantly at any time, especially
with an upturn in the economy.
The point of this analysis has not been to predict whether
President Obama's agenda will be enacted. At this point, there is
no way to know. Instead, it has been, first, to describe the
significant limitations on fundamental institutional change that
the Obama Administration is now confronting. The mere fact of
substantial congressional majorities does not necessarily
translate into transformative legislative enactments. One needs
political support to enact fundamental institutional change and
the degree of Obama's support is now being tested. Perhaps the
most that can be said now is that Obama will find it much easier
to enact his full agenda if he and the Democrats are able to
maintain political support in subsequent elections.
Second. the analysis speaks to the legitimacy of Obama
either passing or failing to pass fundamental institutional change.
If Obama is able to enact his full agenda, then he would have
successfully surmounted a system that puts real constraints on
the passage of fundamental change. His agenda could not. then,
easily be dismissed as that of a short term majority that had
exploited its powers. Rather, in a sense, the Democrats would
have earned their enactments (whether or not one regards them
as desirable). But if Obama fails to enact his full agenda-if he
63. See Gallup Poll. supra note 61 ( .. But after the drop in his support during the
last quarter. his average now ranks near the bottom for presidents at similar points in
their presidencies ... ) Moreover. President Obama·s approval is below 50 percent under
the Rasmussen poll. which queries likely voters. See Rasmussen Reports. Obama
Approval Index History. http://www.rasmussenreports.cornfpublic_content/politics/
obama_administration/obama_approval_index_history (last visited October 20. 2009)
(Obama approved by 47 percent. while disapproved by 52 percent of likely voters).
64. Gallup Poll. for the week ending February 7. Obama·s approval for
Independents is 46 percent. at http://www.gallup.com/poll/politics.aspx (last visited
February 11. 2010).
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enacts only some parts or only watered down versions-then one
can say that desirable checks on substantial change had operated
to block it.
Of course, that the existing political system places a check
on fundamental institutional change does not mean it is the ideal
check. One might forcefully argue that the original
Constitution's more robust federalism was a superior system
because it required that most fundamental change be enacted by
states in competition with one another. But unfortunately that
system is gone for now, and perhaps, forever. The existing
system does a tolerable job and it is that system that the Obama
Administration must confront.

